Securing Europe’s technological sovereignty in defence through the next MFF

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The next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034 must enable Europe to retain control and full autonomy over the technologies deployed by its armed forces. Europe is entering a decisive period for its security and defence, forcing it to respond with an ambitious increase in European defence funding. Yet the success of this effort will not only depend on how much Europe spends.

 

EU defence funding must secure European design authority over critical capabilities

The current MFF has laid important foundations for building a genuine European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), notably through the European Defence Fund (EDF), ASAP, EDIRPA and now the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP). These programmes, including the associated regulatory framework, remain necessary. They are currently the only means available to close Europe’s technological gap and strengthen its production capacity to meet the requirements of a war economy. A question remains: Are they sufficient?

Europe still has a technological gap to close, requiring further efforts, particularly in emerging and strategic technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum, air defence, space, and other critical technologies.

Previous EU programmes have failed to translate European public funding into sufficient industrial contracts for European companies. In some cases, contracts have even been awarded to non-European companies, notably on grounds of cost or technological dependencies. If this approach continues, it risks weakening European companies and progressively eroding the EDTIB for decades to come.

The debate on the participation of “third parties” in current programmes has focused too heavily on percentages, rather than on the fundamental issue of technological sovereignty. The key objective should be for the EU to retain the design authority over the entirety of the strategic capabilities financed through EU defence programmes, and as close to full design authority as possible for other capabilities. The central question is therefore not simply how much third-party participation is allowed, but who ultimately controls the technology, its evolution, and the ability to develop and maintain the capability independently?

 

Applying European preference from defence R&D to joint procurement

This implies that European preference should apply across three critical requirements:

Defence R&D funded under the next MFF shall be subject, at a minimum, to conditions equivalent to those currently applying under the EDF, including appropriate safeguards to ensure that publicly funded intellectual property remains under European ownership and control for a sufficiently long period, ideally at least 15 years. This would create a strong European defence R&D base.

To preserve critical industrial know-how, enable companies to scale up production capacity, and build and maintain adequate stocks of critical raw materials and components, a genuine European preference must be ensured in subsidised joint procurement programmes. European companies shall benefit from a sufficiently strong preference in joint defence procurements supported by European funding.

Where a capability or component is procured from a third party, the EU should retain, at a minimum, design authority over the relevant component, ensuring that it can be independently evolved, maintained and integrated into the wider system. In parallel, the beneficiary should be required to launch an R&D initiative aimed at developing a European alternative that could ultimately replace the third-party solution.

 

Make European preference a strategic imperative for 2028-2034

Without a genuine European preference, the next MFF risks weakening rather than consolidating the financial and industrial efforts that Europe’s defence industrial base has made in recent years, from research and development through to industrial production and joint procurement.

This would have far-reaching strategic consequences: Europe could progressively lose the ability to independently access and master cutting-edge critical defence technologies and weapon systems in key domains such as air and missile defence, long-range strike capabilities and electronic warfare.

Even more critically, it could become dependent on non-European suppliers for advanced combat aircraft, missile systems and other critical defence technologies may create long-term dependencies for software updates, spare parts, maintenance and technical support, and potentially even for the authorisation required to use these systems operationally.

European funding must therefore strengthen European industrial capacity and strategic autonomy, rather than reinforce or create new dependencies.